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Abstract: This paper reports the results of two experiments, each consisting of six sessions, designed to
investigate difficulties that arise in estimating expected litigation costs in an auditing game. In each experimental
session, the game consists of a series of periods in which sellers submit sealed offers to computerized buyers and,
if hired, choose an effort level (low or high). The effort level affects the certain (direct) and uncertain (litigation)
costs of performing the engagement. Across the two experiments, we vary the uncertainty surrounding the
determination of the expected litigation cost. Our results strongly suggest that cognitive limitations hinder sellers’
abilities to estimate total expected litigation costs. Across both experiments we observe a nontrivial number of
suboptimal effort choices. Moreover, as the uncertainty of determining the expected litigation cost increases, the
frequency of observed fee offers below the total expected cost of an engagement increases markedly.
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1. Introduction
Much has been written about the liability crisis facing auditors in North America and the
United Kingdom.  The total legal claims against auditors are staggering, with estimates in the
billions of dollars (e.g., Hill, Metzger, and Schatzberg [1993]; Jaffee [1994]).  Reports indicate
that the Big Six firms are now spending more than 15 percent of their audit and accounting
revenue on professional-liability coverage (McDonald [1997]).  Practitioners contend that
runaway litigation is threatening the survival of accounting firms of all sizes and could destroy the
profession as a whole (O’Malley [1993, p. 82]).  As a consequence, auditors have lobbied heavily
for reform, most notably in the area of damage sharing.  
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While institutional arrangements and damage-sharing regimes are certainly of interest and
have important economic consequences, a more fundamental issue is the auditor’s ability, a priori,
to estimate and manage the total cost of an engagement.  If the auditor is unable to accurately
assess total expected cost in the long run, effort choices and fee offers may be suboptimal.  In
turn, lobbying efforts and concerns over professional liability may, to some extent, be misplaced. 
The total expected cost of an engagement consists of two components: the direct cost of
planning and performing the audit and the expected cost of litigation.  Both costs are affected by
the auditor’s effort choice.  The direct cost is increasing in effort, whereas the expected litigation
cost is decreasing in effort.  The auditor likely has little difficulty estimating direct costs because
such costs are known with relative certainty once an effort level is chosen.  By comparison,
problems can arise in estimating expected litigation costs because of cognitive limitations. 2
Litigation costs, including settlement costs, legal costs, and loss of reputation, are uncertain and
incurred in some periods and not in others.  Although the auditor’s effort choice affects the
likelihood that litigation costs are incurred, uncertainty remains. 
Insight into auditor behavior is provided by research in behavioral decision making, which
suggests that individuals in general have difficulty coping with uncertainty (e.g., Lipshitz and
Strauss [1997]).  This difficulty can create a major obstacle to effective decision making (e.g.,
Brunsson [1985]; Orasanu and Connolly [1993]).  For the auditor, problems may arise in the
conceptualization and assessment of expected litigation costs.  In pricing an engagement and
choosing an effort level, the auditor may downplay uncertainty and focus unduly on the direct
cost of an engagement.  Such behavior enables the auditor to conserve cognitive effort and avoid
delay in decision making.  However, by focusing on direct costs, the auditor’s behavior may be
suboptimal and diverge from theoretical predictions.
We conduct two experiments, each consisting of six sessions, to explore effort choices and
fee offers in an auditing game.  Across both experiments, the game is characterized as follows. 
Each session consists of a series of periods in which individuals submit sealed offers to provide
investigation services and, if hired, choose an effort level: low or high.  The level chosen affects
the direct (certain) and expected (uncertain) cost of performing the engagement.  Within each
experiment, we manipulate the direct cost of providing high effort between sessions.  This
manipulation allows us to determine whether individuals focus unduly on direct costs in making
decisions.
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Across the two experiments, we vary the uncertainty surrounding the determination of
expected litigation costs, which include legal costs.  In experiment one, the auditor incurs legal3
costs regardless of the outcome of litigation, which is akin to the current system in the United
States and is referred to as the American rule.  In contrast, in our second experiment the auditor
must pay legal costs, but only if liable for damages suffered.  This is the cost allocation system in
place in the United Kingdom and is referred to as the British rule.  Practitioners in the United
States support the adoption of the British rule because it is believed to reduce the number of
frivolous lawsuits (e.g., Lochner [1993]; O’Malley [1993]).  But the British rule introduces an
added layer of uncertainty (i.e., whether legal costs must be paid), which can make it more
difficult to assess the expected litigation costs.  A comparison of results between the two
experiments sheds light on whether behavior generalizes across settings in which the legal cost
allocation rule differs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we describe the experimental
method.  Next, we present theoretical and behavioral predictions and report the results of the two
experiments.  Lastly, we provide concluding remarks.
2.  Research Method
2.1 Participants and Procedures
We conduct 12 experimental sessions, each consisting of six participants.  The participants
are recruited from third- and fourth-year undergraduate and fifth-year post-baccalaureate students
in business and economics attending a medium-sized university.  In experiment one (two),
students earned from $13.00 to $41.74 ($13.50 to $39.44), with an average of $18.84 ($16.76),
for participating approximately 100 minutes.4
Experiment one consists of sessions 1-6 across which we manipulate the direct cost of
high effort.  In all six sessions, the American rule is used to determine who is responsible for the
payment of legal costs.  Experiment two consists of sessions 7-12.  Again we manipulate the
direct cost of high effort between sessions, but the British rule is used to determine who is
responsible for the payment of legal costs.  The experimental design is summarized in Table 1.
At the beginning of each session, instructions are distributed and read aloud.   To ensure
3
that participants understand the instructions, a short quiz is administered.  The quiz includes six
questions and participants are paid $0.50 for each correct answer.  Upon completion of the quiz,
the answers are announced and thoroughly explained.
4
Participants use a computer to complete the remainder of the experiment.  Participants
assume the role of a seller, who provides investigation services to a buyer.  The buyer’s role is
assumed by the computer.  The buyer must decide whether to invest in a project, where two types
are possible: type I and type II.  A type I project produces a profit of $11.00 (B), whereas a type I
II project produces a loss of $10.00 (B ).  The buyer cannot observe the project type ex ante, but II
knows the prior probability of each is 50 percent (Q and Q ).  As such, the buyer hires a seller to I    II
report on the project type and then invests accordingly.
The sequence of procedures that occur each period is summarized in Table 2 and the
experimental parameters are provided in Table 3.  Initially, sellers submit offers to provide
investigation services to verify project type, where a maximum offer is specified.   The five lowest
5
offers are accepted and the highest accepted offer is announced.   Ties are settled randomly.  
6
If a seller is hired, an effort (investigation) level is chosen and a cost is incurred.  A low
level of effort (DC) has a direct cost of $0.50.  In experiment one (two), a high level of effort  l5
(DC ) has a direct cost of $1.50 in session 1-2 (7-8), $2.50 in sessions 3-4 (9-10), and $3.50 in h
sessions 5-6 (11-12).  The effort level affects the probability that a type II project is mistakenly
identified as a type I project ($ ) and the probability that the seller is held accountable (liable) for e
the buyer’s losses (J ).  Participants are informed that $ is 60 percent, J is 90 percent, $  is 40 e            l        l        h
percent, and J is 40 percent.  To emphasize the importance of $  and J  in assessing potential h                   e    e
losses, participants also are informed of the joint probability that the seller makes a mistake and is
held accountable: 54 percent for low effort and 16 percent for high effort.  Subsequently, the
computer determines the outcome of the investigation.  The buyer always (never) invests when
the seller’s report indicates that the project is type I (II).  If a type II project is mistakenly
identified as type I, the buyer suffers a loss of $10.00.  According to the predetermined
probabilities, the computer determines whether the seller is accountable and informs the seller. 
The buyer, on the other hand, is not informed.  
The buyer may file for arbitration in an attempt to recoup losses.  If arbitration is pursued,
each party incurs a cost of $2.50 (F  and F ), though the legal cost allocation rule determines who b    s
actually pays the cost.  In experiment one (the American rule), each party pays $2.50.  In
experiment two (the British rule), the loser pays the total cost of arbitration, which is $5.00 (i.e.,
the loser pays the winner’s cost).  
In order to avoid arbitration, the seller is permitted to make a settlement offer.  The seller
knows that the buyer is risk neutral and will accept any offer that equals or exceeds the expected
value of pursuing arbitration.  The seller also is informed that the buyer attempts to infer whether
the seller is accountable based on the settlement offer.  We include settlement offers to gain6
insight into whether the seller can make an accurate assessment of the total cost associated with
arbitration, which is a component of the expected litigation cost.
The buyer is programmed to behave as follows.  Settlement offers that equal or exceed a
minimum amount are accepted.  In experiment one, this amount is $7.50, which equals the buyer’s
loss (B ) less the arbitration cost that is avoided by reaching a settlement (F ).  In experiment two, II                         b
this amount is $10.00, which equals the buyer’s loss (B ).  Under the British rule, arbitration costs II
are not considered in determining the minimum acceptable offer because the winner does not pay
such costs.  In both experiments, offers that are less than the minimum acceptable amount but
greater than zero are rejected and arbitration is pursued.  In this case, the buyer infers that the
seller is accountable.  A mixed strategy is used when settlement offers equal zero (i.e., arbitration
is pursued in some instances and not in others). With an offer of zero, the buyer cannot distinguish
whether the seller is accountable and bluffing or not accountable.  The buyer is programmed to
file for arbitration with a probability of 60 percent when the settlement offer is zero in experiment
one and 67 percent in experiment two (r ). e
The computer determines the outcome of the arbitration process and the seller’s payoff. 
Participants are paid $10.00 for completing the experiment and allowed to keep any additional
earnings (and not required to cover losses).   The experimental procedures are repeated in
7
subsequent periods.  Each experimental session consists of 30 periods and participants are not
informed beforehand of the number of periods.  
At the end of each session, a post-experiment questionnaire is administered.  The
questionnaire is designed to collect general information about participants and how they view the
experiment.   Three open-ended questions also are included to probe how participants determined
87
effort level, fee offers, and settlement offers.  Participants are paid $2.00 for completing the
questionnaire.
2.2 Theoretical and Behavioral Predictions
We develop competing predictions in light of the setting described in the preceding
section.  We predict differences in behavior based on the direct cost of high effort (i.e., $1.50
versus $2.50 versus $3.50), where the predictions are similar across the two experiments.   We do
not predict differences between the two experiments.  Rather, the two experiments allow us to
determine whether behavior generalizes across settings in which the legal cost allocation rule
differs.
Using the experimental parameters summarized in Table 3, we predict effort choices and
fee offers assuming that the seller minimizes total expected cost.  In addition, we develop
behavioral predictions recognizing that the seller may focus unduly on the direct cost of an
engagement.
To minimize cost, the seller compares the total expected cost of alternative effort levels
(the model development is detailed in the appendix).  The expected total cost is expressed as
E(TC) = DC  + E(LC) e   e  e
where E(·) is the expectations operator and TC, DC, and LC  are the total cost, direct cost, and e  e   e
litigation cost, respectively, associated with effort level e for e = l (low), h (high).  In experiment
one, the expected litigation cost is
E(LC) = [Q* $  * J  * (B  - F)] + [Q* $  * (1 - J) * F  * r] e   II  e  e  II  b   II  e    e   s  e8
where Q  is the probability of a type II project, $  is the probability that a type II project is II                  e
mistakenly identified as type I, J  is the probability that the seller is held accountable for the e
buyer’s losses, B  is the loss that arises from investing in a type II project, F  is the buyer’s II                          b
arbitration cost, F  is the seller’s arbitration cost, and r  is the probability that the buyer files for s              e
arbitration when the seller’s settlement offer is zero.  The product in the first set of brackets
represents the expected cost if the seller is accountable for the buyer’s losses.  The product in the
second set of brackets represents the expected cost if the seller is not accountable, but the buyer
pursues arbitration.
In experiment two, the expected litigation cost is
E(LC  ) = Q *$ * J * B . e      II  e    e    II
The product represents the expected cost if the seller is accountable for the buyer’s losses.  As
compared with the American rule, F  and F  are irrelevant because these costs are borne by the b    s
loser if arbitration is pursued.
Point predictions and directional hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.  In experiment
one (two), based on the parameter values, E(LC) = $2.07 ($2.70) and E(LC ) = $0.78 ($0.80).  l           h
Across both experiments, theory predicts that the seller minimizes total cost by choosing high
effort when DC  = $1.50 and low effort when DC  = $2.50 or $3.50.  Predictions for fee offers h              h
follow naturally assuming competitive markets, in which case fees are predicted to converge to
the minimum total expected cost.  In experiment one (two), predicted fees are $2.28 ($2.30),
$2.57 ($3.20), and $2.57 ($3.20) when DC  = $1.50, $2.50, and $3.50, respectively. h
Although theory provides a basis for point predictions, experimental results typically
deviate from such predictions.  Deviations may occur because theoretical predictions rely on9
simplifying assumptions (e.g., individuals know one another’s utility functions).  As a
consequence, theoretical predictions are viewed as benchmarks for comparisons which provide a
basis to posit directional hypotheses (Dopuch, King, and Schatzberg [1994, 123-124]).
Behavioral theory also provides a foundation for directional hypotheses.  These
predictions recognize that the seller has difficulty estimating the expected litigation cost, which
makes it difficult to compare total cost across effort levels.  Thus, the seller may compare the
attributes of alternative effort levels (e.g., Svenson [1979]; Montgomery [1983]).  The seller
knows the difference between DC and DC  with certainty.  The seller also knows that E(LC) - l    h                 l
E(LC ) > 0, but does not know the magnitude of the difference.  Because of the uncertainty h
surrounding the expected litigation cost and the seller’s cognitive limitations, the seller may focus
unduly on direct cost.  We do not suggest that the seller ignores E(LC ), but rather that the e
litigation cost is of relatively less concern as the difference between DC and DC  increases.  As l    h
this difference increases, a choice of low effort may be perceived to be more justifiable (e.g.,
Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky [1993]).  Across both experiments, we hypothesize that high effort
is chosen less frequently as the direct cost of high effort increases. 
Difficulty in estimating expected litigation cost also can affect fee offers.  In this case the
seller uses alternative strategies, rather than focusing on the minimum cost of the engagement.  A
potential strategy involves the use of a focal point in setting fees (Schelling [1957]).  Certain fee
levels may become prominent for reasons that are not captured by theoretical predictions.  We
investigate whether the auditor fixates on the direct costs associated with alternative effort
choices in making pricing decisions.  Specifically, we hypothesize that the direct cost of high
effort serves as a lower bound in determining fees because such a strategy ensures that the seller10
covers the certain cost component.  With this type of pricing strategy, the seller is able to make a
profit as long as litigation costs are avoided,  regardless of the effort level chosen.  Across both
experiments, the behavioral prediction is that fee offers increase as the direct cost of high effort
increases.
Although the focus of this study is on effort choices and fee offers, we also explore
settlement offers.  The theoretical prediction is that if the seller is not liable, the settlement offer
should be zero, regardless of the legal cost allocation rule.  If liable, on the other hand, the seller
should offer an amount that covers the buyer’s losses minus avoidable arbitration costs (if
applicable) with probability a  and zero with probability 1-a (see appendix).  In experiment one e          e  
this amount is $7.50 ($10.00 - $2.50), and in experiment two it is $10.00.  Furthermore, in
experiment one (two), a  is 50 percent (24 percent) when the optimal effort choice is high (DC  = e                          h
$1.50) and 96.3 percent (44.4 percent) when it is low (DC  = $2.50 or $3.50).  Uncertainty h
surrounding the arbitration process, however, may result in nonzero settlement offers that differ
from predicted amounts.  Behavioral theory recognizes that the seller may have difficulty
determining optimal settlement offers because of cognitive limitations, but it does not provide a
basis for predicting differences between the three experimental groups.  Therefore, we do not
make behavioral predictions about settlement offers. 11
3. Results
3.1 Effort Choice
For each experiment we perform an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect
of the direct cost of high effort (DC) on the seller’s effort choice.   The dependent variable is the h
9
proportion of times that the seller chooses high effort over periods 1-30.  
10
3.1.1 Experiment One. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, DC  is statistically significant at p h
= 0.023.  The cell means indicate that high effort is chosen slightly more than half of the time in
the DC150 group and slightly less than one third of the time in the DC250 and DC350 groups.  h              h   h
Newman-Keuls pairwise tests indicate that DC150 is significantly different from DC250 and h      h
DC350 at p < 0.05, whereas DC250 and DC350 are not statistically different from one another.  h       h   h
The results are consistent with the theoretical, directional hypothesis (H1), though differing T
markedly from point predictions (see hypotheses summarized in Table 4).
Deviations from point predictions may arise because of cognitive limitations which affect
the seller's ability to estimate expected litigation costs.   Sellers' settlement offers provide
11
additional insight into this issue.  Theoretical predictions indicate that if the seller is liable,
settlement offers should equal zero or $7.50.  The frequencies of these offers per group are
reported in Panel A of Table 6.  We find that 44 of 168 offers (or 26 percent) are consistent with
theoretical predictions.  The majority of offers fall between zero and $7.50.  We compute the
mean, nonzero settlement offer, which provides an estimate of the loss expected by the seller due
to arbitration, and find that it is $4.07, $5.51, and $5.36 for the DC150, DC250, and DC350 h  h   h
groups, respectively.  Each differs significantly from $7.50 at p < 0.01 using two-tailed t-tests. 
These results provide evidence that sellers have difficulty estimating expected arbitration costs.
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3.1.2 Experiment Two. As shown in Panel B of Table 5, DC  is statistically significant at p h
= 0.001.  The cell means indicate that high effort is chosen slightly less than half of the time in the
DC150 and DC250 groups and less than 10 percent of the time in the DC350 group.  Newman- h   h             h
Keuls pairwise tests indicate that DC150 and DC250 differ significantly from DC350 at p < h   h     h
0.05, but not from one another.  The results are not consistent with either theoretical or
behavioral directional hypotheses.
13
To gain further insight, we investigate the seller’s settlement offers.  Theoretical
predictions indicate that if the seller is liable, settlement offers should equal zero or $10.00.  The
frequencies of these offers per group are reported in Panel B of Table 6.  We find that 76 of 203
offers (or 37 percent) are consistent with theoretical predictions.  The majority of offers fall
between the zero and $10.00.  The mean, nonzero offer is $5.73, $7.00, and $6.99 for the
DC150, DC250, and DC350 groups, respectively, and each differs significantly from $10.00 at h  h   h
p < 0.001 using two-tailed t-tests.  As with experiment one, the results suggest that sellers have
difficulty estimating expected arbitration costs.
14
3.2 Fee Offers
For each experiment we investigate observed fee behavior per session and then perform an
ANOVA to examine the effects of DC  on the seller’s fee offers.  The dependent variable is the h
average fee offer per seller over periods 1-30. 
3.2.1 Experiment One. Figures 1-3 show plots of the highest accepted fee offer per period
for the DC150, DC250, and DC350 groups, respectively.  The time series reveal an interesting h  h   h
behavioral pattern: fee offers appear to oscillate between bounds.  The highest accepted offer is13
typically above the competitive price and at times reaches the maximum allowed offer.  Moreover,
it never falls below the direct cost of high effort.  The highest accepted fee appears to move
downward for a period of time, due to competitive pressures, before ratcheting upward toward
the maximum allowed offer.  This pattern then repeats itself.
15
The time series data suggest that the direct cost of high effort is focal in determining fee
offers.  We investigate whether all fee offers are bounded from below by the direct cost of high
effort.  Across sessions 1-6, only 13 of 1,080 offers (or 1.2 percent) are below DC : one in h
session 1, nine in session 5, and three in session 6.  Twelve of 13 instances occur in the first four
periods and one occurs in the eighth period.  Hence, DC  appears to be prominent and serve as a h
lower bound in determining fee offers.  This result is suggestive of the behavioral directional
hypothesis (H2 ). B
Next we perform an ANOVA to formally test whether DC  affects the seller’s fee offers.  h
The results, shown in Panel A of Table 7, indicate that DC  is significant at p < 0.001.   The cell h
16
means increase as the cost of high effort increases.  Using Newman-Keuls tests, we find that all
pairwise comparisons are significant at p < 0.05.  These findings are consistent with H2 . B
We also investigate deviations in the seller's fee offers from the competitive price.  For
each experimental group, we compute the average fee offer per seller over periods 1-30
standardized by the competitive price.  The means are 1.17, 1.18, and 1.44 for the DC 150, h
DC 250, and DC 350 groups, respectively.  Each mean is significantly different from the h     h
competitive price at p < 0.01 using two-tailed t-tests.  The results are unchanged when we
examine the standardized average accepted fee offer per seller.   Notably, fees include a
1714
premium, even when the direct cost of high effort is well below the competitive price (as in the
DC150 group). h
3.2.2 Experiment Two. Figures 4-6 show plots of the highest accepted fee offer per period
for the DC150, DC250, and DC350 groups, respectively.  In sessions 7-8 (DC150), the highest h  h   h        h
accepted offer declines gradually over time and falls below the competitive price, though typically
remaining above the direct cost of high effort.  In sessions 9-10 (DC250), the highest accepted h
fee moves downward, toward the competitive price, before ratcheting upward -- always remaining
above the direct cost of high effort.  In session 11 (DC350), the highest accepted fee oscillates h
between the maximum fee and the direct cost of high effort, never falling below the competitive
price.  By comparison, in session 12 (DC350) the highest accepted fee declines over time and h
falls well below the direct cost of high effort and the competitive price.
To provide a basis for comparison with experiment one, we investigate whether the direct
cost of high effort appears to be focal in determining fee offers.  Across sessions 7-11, only 29 of
900 offers (or 3.2 percent) are below DC: 23 in session 8, three in session 9, and three in session h
11.  Twenty-eight instances occur in the first six periods and one occurs in the twentieth period. 
For sessions 7-11, DC  appears to serve as a lower bound in determining fee offers, which is h
suggestive of the behavioral directional hypothesis (H2).  In session 12, on the other hand, 171 B
of 180 offers (or 95 percent) are below DC.  The observed fee behavior in this session appears to h
be anomalous.  For some reason, market dynamics drive fees to very low levels.
18
We perform an ANOVA to formally test whether DC  affects the seller’s fee offers.  The h
results, shown in Panel B of Table 7, indicate that DC  is significant at p < 0.001.   The mean fee h
19
offer is lowest in the DC150 group and highest in the DC250 group.  The mean fee offer of the h       h15
DC 350 group is in the middle because of the peculiar fee behavior observed in session 12.   h
20
Looking at the two DC 350 sessions separately, we find that the mean fee offers are $3.81 and h
$2.22 in sessions 11 and 12, respectively. 
We also investigate deviations in the seller's fee offers from the competitive price.  For
each experimental group, we compute the average fee offer per seller over periods 1-30
standardized by the competitive price.  The means are 0.93, 1.11, and 0.95 for the DC 150, h
DC 250, and DC 350 groups, respectively.  The mean for DC 150 (DC 250) is significantly h     h              h   h
different from the competitive price at p = 0.066 (p = 0.012) using a two-tailed t-test.   The mean
21
for the DC 350 group is not significantly different from the competitive price because of the h
divergent fee behavior observed across sessions 11 and 12.
4. Conclusion
This paper reports the results of two experiments, each consisting of six sessions, designed
to investigate whether sellers focus unduly on the direct cost of an engagement.  Such behavior
may arise because the seller has difficulty estimating expected litigation costs.  Across the two
experiments, we vary the uncertainty surrounding the determination of the expected litigation
costs, which include legal costs.  In experiment one, the seller incurs legal costs regardless of the
outcome of litigation (the American rule).  In experiment two, the seller must pay legal costs, but
only if liable for damages suffered (the British rule).  Hence, in experiment two, an added layer of
uncertainty is introduced concerning the determination of expected litigation cost.
Our results strongly suggest that cognitive limitations hinder sellers’ abilities to assess
total expected litigation cost.  In experiment one, sellers’ effort choices are generally consistent16
with theoretical, directional predictions, though differing markedly from point predictions.   A
majority of the time sellers choose effort levels that minimize the expected total cost of the
engagement; however, a nontrivial number of suboptimal effort choices is observed.  In
experiment two, sellers’ effort choices are not consistent with theoretical, directional predictions
and in some cases suboptimal effort levels are chosen a majority of the time.  The additional
uncertainty introduced by the British rule of legal cost allocation appears to hamper performance.
Cognitive limitations also appear to affect fee offers.  Across the two experiments, the
data from 11 of 12 sessions suggest that the direct cost of high effort (DC ) is focal and serves as h
a lower bound in determining fee offers.  In sessions 1-6 of experiment one, only 13 of 1,080
offers (or 1.2 percent) are below DC .  In sessions 7-11 of experiment two, only 29 of 900 offers h
(or 3.2 percent) are below DC .  The observed fee behavior in session 12, which is not consistent h
with that observed in other sessions, appears to be anomalous.  One difference stands out when
we compare fees across the two experiments.  In experiment one, fees typically include a
premium: fees tend to be above the competitive price.  In experiment two, this result does not
hold: fees often fall below the competitive price.  Again, the additional uncertainty introduced by
the British rule of legal cost allocation appears to detract from performance, sometimes driving
fees below the total expected cost of the engagement.
In sum, our findings suggest unequivocally that sellers have difficulties coping with
uncertain costs.  Such difficulties are intensified as the complexities involved in the determination
of uncertain costs are increased (e.g., going from the American rule of legal cost allocation to the
British rule).  Our findings suggest that as these difficulties increase, the likelihood of suboptimal
behavior increases.  Future theoretical work is advised to incorporate cognitive limitations that17
impede sellers’ abilities to accurately assess uncertain costs and, with respect to pricing, cause
them to unduly focus on the certain costs of alternative effort choices.18
Appendix
Proposition 1: With the American rule of legal cost allocation, if
 DC  + (Q  * $ ) * [J  * (B  - F ) + (1 - J ) * F  * r ] h    II    h     h    II    b         h     s    h
                                    # DC + (Q  * $) * [J * (B  - F ) + (1 - J) * F  * r],  (A1) l    II    l     l    II    b         l     s    l
the seller chooses high effort.  Otherwise, the seller chooses low effort.  If the buyer suffers a loss,
the seller is permitted to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer in order to avoid arbitration costs. 
Settlement offers are as follows.  If not accountable, the seller only offers zero.  If accountable,
the seller offers B  - F  with probability a  and zero with probability 1 - a , where e = h, l and a II    b      e              e               e
solves the following equation.
                                            [J  * (B  - F ) * (1 - a )] - [(1 - J ) * F ] = 0. (A2) e    II    b         e         e     b
The buyer accepts the offer B  - F  and files for arbitration with probability r  after receiving an II    b              e
offer of zero, where r  solves the following equation e
                                                             B  - F  = (B  + F ) * r . (A3) II    b    II    s     e 
Then the seller’s total cost is 
TC  = DC  + (Q  * $ ) * [J  * (B  - F ) + (1 - J ) * F  * r ]. e    e    II    e     e    II    b         e     s    e
Proof: The seller does not make a settlement offer between zero and B  - F  because such an offer II    b
signals that the seller is accountable.  If the seller is not accountable, only settlements of zero are
offered.  If accountable, the seller offers either zero or B  - F .  The probability that an II    b
accountable seller offers B  - F  is determined by equation A2, which makes the buyer indifferent II    b
between filing or not filing for arbitration.  Similarly, the probability that a buyer files for19
arbitration after receiving an offer of zero is determined by equation A3, which makes an
accountable seller indifferent between offering zero or B  - F . II    b
The seller chooses an effort level to minimize the expected total cost.  If inequality A1
holds, the expected total cost is lower with high effort.  Conversely, if inequality A1 does not
hold, the expected total cost is lower with low effort.
Proposition 2: With the British rule of legal cost allocation, if
DC + Q  * $  * J * B  # DC + Q  * $ * J * B (A4) h    II    h    h    II    l    II    l    l    II
the seller chooses high effort.  Otherwise, the seller chooses low effort. After the buyer suffers a
loss, the seller makes the following settlement offers.  If not accountable, the seller only offers
zero.  If accountable, the seller offers B  with probability a  and zero with probability 1 - a , where II      e              e
e=h, l and a  solves the following equation. e
J  * B  * (1 - a ) - (1 - J ) * (F + F ) = 0. (A5) e    II         e         e     b    s
The buyer accepts the offer B  and files for arbitration with probability r after receiving an offer II              e 
of zero, where r  solves the following equation e
B  = (B  + F + F ) * r (A6) II    II    b    s     e.
Then the seller's total cost is
TC = DC + Q *$ * J * B . e    e    II  e    e    II
Proof: The seller does not make a settlement offer between zero and B  because such an offer II
signals that the seller is accountable.  If the seller is not accountable, only settlements of zero are
offered.  If accountable, the seller offers either zero or B .  The probability that an accountable II20
seller offers B  is determined by equation A5, which makes the buyer indifferent between filing or II
nor filing for arbitration.  Similarly, the probability that a buyer files for arbitration after receiving
an offer of zero is determined by equation A6, which makes an accountable seller indifferent
between offering zero or B .  II
The seller chooses an effort to minimize the expected total cost.  If inequality A4 holds,
the expected total cost is lower with high effort. Conversely, if inequality A4 does not hold, the
expected total cost is lower with low effort.21
1. In the United States, the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995 was recently enacted, which
provides for proportionate liability, in which case the auditor’s liability is assessed on a basis
proportional to fault.  In the United Kingdom, the Auditing Practices Board proposed to cap the
auditor’s liability, in which case the auditor and client would negotiate and contract on a liability
limit.  As discussed subsequently, another difference between the audit environment in the United
States and the United Kingdom involves the allocation of legal costs.
2. Previous studies have examined the effects of alternative liability and damage-sharing regimes
on behavior in experimental audit markets (e.g., Dopuch and King [1992]; Wallin [1992];
Dopuch, King, and Schatzberg [1994]; Dopuch, Ingberman, and King [1997]; Gramling,
Schatzberg, Bailey, and Zhang [1998]).  These studies manipulate the expected litigation cost,
holding direct cost constant, and show that the structure of the legal system can have important
effects on economic efficiencies.  While the legal system is clearly of consequence, the direct cost
of alternative effort choices may be dominant in decision making.  Direct costs are known and
largely controllable and, thus, play an important role in decision making. 
3. A copy of the experimental instructions is available from the authors upon request.
4. The mean and median number of correct answers across participants in experiment one (two)
are 4.5 (4.9) and 5.0 (5.0), respectively. 
5. The buyer is willing to pay up to the amount that the investigation service has value (i.e., the
benefit of acquiring the service equals or exceeds the cost).
6. The engagement risk associated with the prospective client is assumed to be acceptable.  We do
not address instances in which risk differs across prospective clients or, broadly speaking, client
acceptance issues.  For insight into such issues, see Gramling, Schatzberg, Bailey, and Zhang
(1998).
7. The experimental parameters are designed such that additional earnings are expected to be zero
if the seller’s services are priced competitively and the seller behaves in accordance with
theoretical predictions.
8. Participants' responses to the post-experiment questionnaire suggest that they found the
experiment interesting and the monetary incentives somewhat motivating.  Participants responded
on a seven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not very
interesting and 7 = very interesting.  In experiment one (two), the mean response was 5.86 (5.36). 
Participants also responded on a seven-point scale as to how they would characterize the amount
of money earned for taking part in the experiment, where 1 = nominal amount and 7 =
considerable amount.  In experiment one (two), the mean response was 3.89 (4.44).
9. The analyses reported in the paper are repeated excluding data from the first five and ten
periods.  In all cases, inferences are unaffected.
Endnotes22
10. Press (1972, 264-265) warns that when using proportions, variances are a function of group
means.  So unequal means can cause heteroskedasticity.  An arcsine square root transformation is
recommended.  We applied this transformation to the dependent variable and repeated the
analysis.  Inferences are unaffected.  
11. When participants were asked how they determined their effort level, no response was
provided by a majority.  The most common response was that no systematic method was used in
choosing an effort level.
12. When participants were asked how they determined settlement offers, we observed two
frequent responses.  Ten of 36 participants indicated that they relied on past experience (see also
Dopuch, Ingberman, and King [1997]), whereas eight indicated that offers were determined
randomly.
13. When participants were asked how they determined their effort level, no response was
provided by a majority.  The most common response was that a risk-return tradeoff was
considered in choosing an effort level.
14. When participants were asked how they determined settlement offers, one common response
was observed.  Twelve of 36 participants indicated that they relied on past experience (see also
Dopuch, Ingberman, and King [1997]).
15. When asked how they determined fee offers, 30 of 36 participants indicated that their offers
were based on the previous period's highest accepted offer.
16. We repeated the analysis using the average accepted fee per seller as the dependent variable
and found similar results.
17. The means are 1.16, 1.16, and 1.43 for the DC 150, DC 250, and DC 350 groups, h   h     h
respectively.  
18. When asked how they determined fee offers, 28 of 36 participants indicated that their offers
were based on the previous period's highest accepted offer.
19. We repeated the analysis using the average accepted fee per seller as the dependent variable
and found similar results.
20. Newman-Keuls pairwise tests indicate that DC 250 and DC 350 are significantly different h     h
from DC 150 at p < 0.05, but not from one another.   h
21. The results are unchanged when we examine the standardized average accepted fee offer per
seller.  The means are 0.93, 1.10, and 0.94 for the DC 150, DC 250, and DC 350 groups, h   h     h
respectively.  23
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Experimental Design
Experiment Session Direct Cost of High Legal Cost









The Sequence of Procedures that Occur Each Period
1. Each seller submits an offer to provide services to a buyer.
2.  The five lowest offers are accepted and the highest accepted offer is announced.
3.  Each seller chooses an effort (investigation) level.
4.  The outcome of the investigation is determined.
5.  If the seller mistakenly identifies a type II project as a type I project, the seller proposes a 
settlement offer.  Otherwise, the period is over.
6. The buyer accepts or rejects the settlement offer.  If the offer is accepted, the period 
is over.
7. The buyer decides whether to pursue the arbitration process.  If arbitration is not pursued, 
the period is over.




1-12 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12
Direct Cost of Low Effort (DC) $0.50 - - - - - - l
Direct Cost of High Effort (DC ) - $1.50 $2.50 $3.50 $1.50 $2.50 $3.50 h
Prob of Type I Project (Q) 50% - - - - - - I
Prob of Type II Project (Q ) 50% - - - - - - II
Buyer’s Payoff for a 
  Type I Project (B) $11.00 - - - - - - I
Buyer’s Payoff for a 
  Type II Project (B ) <$10.00> - - - - - - II
Prob of Incorrectly Identifying a 
  Type II Project | High Effort ($ ) 40% - - - - - - h
Prob of Incorrectly Identifying a 
  Type II Project | Low Effort ($) 60% - - - - - - l
Prob of the Seller Being Held
  Accountable | High Effort (J ) 40% - - - - - - h
Prob of the Seller Being Held 
  Accountable | Low Effort (J) 90% - - - - - - l
Seller’s Arbitration Costs (F ) $2.50 - - - - - - s
Buyer’s Arbitration Cost (F ) $2.50 - - - - - - b
Prob of Arbitration if 
  Settlement Offer is zero (r ) - 60% 60% 60% 67% 67% 67% e
Minimum Acceptable 
  Settlement Offer (MA) - $7.50 $7.50 $7.50 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00
Prob of the buyer Accepting a 
  Nonzero Offer <MA  0% - - - - - -
Prob of the Buyer Accepting a
  Settlement Offer $MA 100% - - - - - -
Maximum Fee Offer Allowed - $3.56 $4.07 $4.07 $3.29 $4.64 $4.64
Parameters that are constant across the two experiments and across sessions are reported in the first column of the table
(labeled 1-12).  Parameters that vary across sessions are reported in subsequent columns.  Parameters that apply to
experiment one (two) are reported in the columns labeled 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 (7-8, 9-10, and 11-12).TABLE 4
Theoretical and Behavioral Predictions
Point Predictions Directional Hypotheses
a
DC 150 DC 250 DC 350 h h h
Theoretical (T)
Frequency of high 
  effort choices
 (exps. 1 and 2) 100% 0% 0% H1 : DC 150 > DC 250 = DC 350 T   h     h     h
Fee offers
 (exp. 1) $2.28 $2.57 $2.57 H2 : DC 150 < DC 250 = DC 350 T   h     h     h




 (exps. 1 and 2) N.A. N.A. N.A. H1 : DC 150 > DC 250 >DC 350 B   h     h   h
Fee offers
  (exps. 1 and 2) N.A. N.A. N.A. H2 : DC 150 < DC 250 < DC 350 B   h     h     h
DC 150, DC 250, DC 350 denote groups in which the direct cost of high effort equals $1.50,
a
h   h   h
$2.50, and $3.50, respectively.TABLE 5
The Effect of the Cost of High Effort (DC) on the Seller’s Effort Choice h
Panel A: Experiment One (Sessions 1-6)
Variable df Sum of Square F-statistic p-value
DC 2 0.449 4.216 0.023 h
Error 33 1.756





Panel B: Experiment Two (Sessions 7-12)
Variable df Sum of Square F-statistic p-value
DC 2 1.020 8.067 0.001 h
Error 33 2.086




DC350 0.0947 hTABLE 6
Frequency of Settlement Offers by Accountable Sellers
Panel A: Experiment One (Sessions 1-6)
Cost of Offer = $0.00 $0.00 < Offer Offer = $7.50 Offer > $7.50 Total
High Effort  < $7.50
DC150 10 26 1 3 40 h
DC250 5 37 11 7 60 h
DC350 8 44 9 7 68 h
Total 23 107 21 17 168
Panel B: Experiment Two (Sessions 7-12)
Cost of Offer = $0.00 $0.00 < Offer Offer = $10.00 Offer > $10.00 Total
High Effort  < $10.00
DC150 22 28 4 4 58 h
DC250 5 36 16 2 59 h
DC350 1 51 28 6 86 h
Total 28 115 48 12 203TABLE 7
The Effect of the Cost of High Effort (DC) on the Seller’s Fee Offer h
Panel A: Experiment One (Sessions 1-6)
Variable df Sum of Square F-statistic p-value
DC 2 6.475 45.976 0.000 h
Error 33 2.324




Panel B: Experiment Two (Sessions 7-12)
Variable df Sum of Square F-statistic p-value
DC 2 12.346 21.665 0.000 h
Error 33 9.402
Cost of High Effort Mean Hired Fee
DC150 $2.15 h
DC250 $3.56 h
DC350 $3.05 hThe figures for this working paper are unavailable in PDF
format. To obtain a hard copy of the figures, please use the
publications order form
http://www.frbatlanta.org/publica/pub_ord/ordform.htm
 on this Web site and request a copy of
Working Paper 98-17.